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Gathering Sense from Song: 
Robert Browning and the 
Romantic Epistemology of  Music
LAURA H. CLARKE
The place of  music in nineteenth- century poetry and fiction has garnered much interest in recent criticism and has stimulated innovative work on 
the idea of  music in nineteenth- century British lit er a ture, including the po liti-
cal, class, and gendered implications of  music in fiction and poetry; yet the 
crucial fact that  music provided poetry with a philosophic language is given 
less attention than it merits.1 Felicia Bonaparte argues that its philosophical 
significance is often missed  because twentieth- and twenty- first- century thought 
has inherited an empirical concept of  music. This is distinct from the Victo-
rian idea of  music that was influenced by German Romantic theory.2 While 
the predominant eighteenth- century empirical view of  music argued that 
instrumental  music was capable of stimulating the physical emotions but was 
unable to convey ideas, German Romantic writers such as Wilhelm Heinrich 
Wackenroder, Ludwig Tieck, Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), the Schle-
gel  brothers, E. T. A Hoffman, Arthur Schopenhauer, and  later Richard Wag-
ner maintained that it was precisely its unmediated quality that allowed  music 
to access Platonic ideas that transcend the sensory realm.3 Believing that  music 
facilitated a perception of the ideal, the German Romantics conceived of  music 
not only as a progression of numerical notes but as way to apprehend universal 
and transcendent ideas that could not be known through the intellect. It was 
this correlation between  music and philosophy that gave  music its crucial place 
in discussions of art and epistemology in the nineteenth  century.4
That Robert Browning shared the Romantic view of  music as the most 
transcendent of all the arts is well attested in criticism of his life and poetry, 
as is his virtuosity as a musician;5 yet despite insightful critical commentary 
elicited by his  music monologues, the fact that Browning utilizes the German 
Romantic theory of  music as a way to discuss epistemological issues has been 
largely overlooked.6 Browning refers to  music hundreds of times in his poetry, 
and he refers to song many more times again; yet  because  these many allusions 
are often only glimpsed in single lines and briefly recurring meta phors, their 
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philosophical significance can easily be missed. Despite the widely held notion 
that Browning espoused an essentially Romantic view of  music, many of the 
critical assumptions about Browning’s  music poems are derived from an em-
pirical concept of  music; therefore, a philosophical paradigm shift is needed in 
order to see how Browning relies on the idealist view of  music to provide his 
reader with an interpretive key for the complex epistemological questions that 
he raises throughout his poetry. To uncover this alternative philosophical 
framework, I examine Browning’s self- proclaimed affinity with the German 
idealist phi los o pher Arthur Schopenhauer,  because an attention to the simi-
larities that Browning found in his foundational philosophical premises re-
veals how  music has a central symbolic significance in the poems that explic itly 
discuss  music and also in impor tant philosophical poems, such as La Saisiaz, 
that have not previously been associated with  music philosophy.
The German Romantic idea that  music precedes the notes that bring it 
forth is an enduring meta phor in Browning’s poetry for two dif fer ent faculties 
of knowledge, which he refers to as “fancy” and “fact,” or reason. While fancy 
intuits the transcendent ideas expressed by  music, the faculty of reason, the 
logical pro cesses of the mind that make judgments based on sense experience, 
can only perceive the external numerical form of  music. Romantic  music phi-
losophy also provides Browning with a symbolic language through which to 
express his theory of the objective poet. Browning’s conception of the objec-
tive poet, and its development in the dramatic monologue form, has typically 
been seen as a rejection of Romantic epistemology; yet the relationship be-
tween the inner realm of  music and the outward expression of sound is sym-
bolic for Browning of the connection between an ideal substrate and its 
manifestation in the real world and also of the connection between the ideal-
ism of the subjective poet and the realism of the objective poet. The  music 
monologues “Master  Hugues of Saxe Gotha,” “A Toccata of Galuppi’s,” and 
“Abt Vogler” are an impor tant explication of this use of symbolism as they 
focus on the tension between the empirical view of  music as form and the 
Romantic view of  music as philosophy in order to express the relationship of 
fancy to reason and of the ideal to the real.
The Romantic philosophy of  music expounded by Tieck, Wackenroder, 
and the Schlegel  brothers finds its most comprehensive exposition in Scho-
penhauer’s The World as  Will and Repre sen ta tion. Critics have variously pro-
moted or denied the significance of Schopenhauer’s philosophy for Browning’s 
poetry: Leslie White explores the similarity between Schopenhauer’s concept 
of  will and Browning’s faith in  human intuition as it is expressed in his early 
poetry, yet Apryl Lea Denny Heath refutes William Lyon Phelps’s suggestion 
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that Schopenhauer may have influenced Browning’s  music monologues  because 
she finds Schopenhauer’s concept of  music to be entirely incompatible with 
Browning’s emphasis on the material world, an issue to which I  will return in 
due course.7 It is clear, however, that Phelps is absolutely justified in perceiving 
the arresting similarities between Schopenhauer and Browning since Brown-
ing recognized them himself.  After reading a biography of Schopenhauer given 
to him in 1876, Browning wrote to Mrs. Ernest Benzon to describe the affinity 
that he had found between himself and the German phi los o pher:
I gain an adequate notion of Schopenhauer and what he accounts his 
 grand discovery. So much of it as I acknowledge for truth as I have believed 
in them from my earliest youth, . . .  the distinction and pre- eminence of 
the Soul from and over the intelligence— “Soul” in the evident sense 
of Schopenhauer’s “ Will”— And the fact was at once so realized by me, 
that I am sure it must show through my writings,  here and  there as their 
substratum.8
Browning states that his foundational convictions regarding soul and 
mind derive from the same epistemological foundation as Schopenhauer’s phi-
losophy and that this shared ground constitutes the “substratum” of his own 
poetic works. This substratum, I argue, is that of philosophical idealism. The 
critical consensus has been, in its dif fer ent forms, that Browning’s concept of 
the objective poet is a repudiation of the absolutes sought by the subjective 
poet—an idea that would also appear at odds with the transcendental founda-
tions of German idealism; yet in The Lucid Veil, W. David Shaw demonstrates 
the pervasive impact that idealist philosophy had on Victorian poets, espe-
cially Browning.9 While Shaw focuses on the compelling correlations between 
Browning and Hegel, Clyde de L. Ryals and Patricia Dianne Rigg, two critics 
who have written on Browning and German philosophy, both analyze Brown-
ing’s poetics within the context of Friedrich Schlegel’s concept of irony;10 how-
ever, it is the point of connection between Schopenhauer and Browning on 
which I focus in this essay  because this par tic u lar relationship illuminates how 
Browning utilizes Romantic  music philosophy to symbolize key epistemological 
issues in his poetry and to express the idealist foundation of his poetic theory.11
Schopenhauer argues in The World as  Will and Repre sen ta tion that  there 
are two aspects to the world— the world of repre sen ta tion and the  will— each 
aspect being dependent on and inseparable from the other.12 The world of 
repre sen ta tion is the objective material world of phenomena as they exist in 
space and time; it is the world of empirical perception and is the manifestation 
of the other aspect of the world, which is the  will. The  will is the realm of the 
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subject and exists entirely outside of time and space, and Schopenhauer ex-
plains that his idea of the  will is analogous to Immanuel Kant’s concept of the 
noumenal: it is “the being- in- itself of  every  thing in the world, and is the sole 
kernel of  every phenomenon” (p. 118). The  will is a universal substrate, en-
compassing and comprising the essences of the entire world; as opposed to 
the mere repre sen ta tion or semblance of a phenomenon, the  will is the 
thing- in- itself.
In contrast to the groundless world of  will, Schopenhauer says that the 
faculty of the understanding perceives the laws of cause and effect that govern 
the world of repre sen ta tion. The senses supply the understanding with data 
from the material world that is then passed into the reflective consciousness of 
the reason. Schopenhauer combines  these branches of knowledge— sense, under-
standing, and reason— into what he calls the princi ple of sufficient reason, 
which may be understood as defining the pro cesses of conceptual thought; 
however, Schopenhauer argues that the understanding can never reveal the 
inner nature or  will of  things  because, in perceiving only the world of cause 
and effect, it is confined to showing “mere connexions, relations, of one repre-
sen ta tion to another, form without any content” (p. 121). It is Schopenhauer’s 
conviction that the  will as thing- in- itself cannot be subject to direct investiga-
tion  because it is not the object of knowledge: the faculty of understanding 
can never penetrate past the phenomenal and into the noumenal, or the inner 
essence of  things. Although Schopenhauer aligns himself with Kant in main-
taining the impossibility of accessing the noumenal, he distinguishes himself 
in asserting that, although the intellect can only know the how and not the 
what of phenomena, we can search for the inner meaning of  things through 
the true inverse of rational knowledge— the intuition of the imagination and 
of feeling, which allows us to know the noumenal aspect of the world.
Browning explic itly aligns his concept of soul with Schopenhauer’s  will 
and reveals the striking similarity of German idealism to his foundational epis-
temology: for Browning, soul is not only a theological concept but also the 
noumenal realm of existence made manifest in the world and in humankind. 
In “Charles Avison,” Browning avers the difficulty of defining soul and seeks 
to compare it against mind, which he sees as corresponding to Schopenhauer’s 
princi ple of sufficient reason.13 Imagining his reader asking for “an illustrative 
image” (l. 150), Browning uses architectural imagery to connote the pro cesses 
of the mind and help define what he means by “soul.” Browning visualizes the 
mind as a worker who seeks to “o’erarch a gulf” (l. 153) and who, in using facts, 
assesses, connects, assimilates, and builds in order to construct knowledge: “he 
digs, transports / Shapes and, through enginery— all sizes, sorts, / Lays stone 
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by stone  until a floor compact / Proves our bridged causeway” (ll. 153–156). 
The mind derives knowledge from data that is taken from the senses: “So 
worked Mind: its tribe / Of senses ministrant above, below, / Far, near, or now 
or haply long ago / Brought to pass knowledge” (ll. 175–178). While the preci-
sion of  these varied movements of the mind are “easy, even, to descry, de-
scribe” (l. 174), Browning says that soul is “An ele ment which works beyond 
our guess” (l. 160). Belonging to the noumenal realm, the soul lies beyond the 
reach of the mind.
A formless voice that comes from within and undulates  under the mind, 
soul is the “unsounded sea— whose lift of surge / Spite of all superstructure” of 
the mind, “lets emerge, / In flower and foam, Feeling from out the deeps” (ll. 
161–163). It is impor tant to remember that  here Browning means “feeling” not 
in its empirical sense but, in accordance with Schopenhauer, as a profound 
intuition of the noumenal substrate of material real ity. Although Browning 
proclaims the ineffable nature of soul— the will- in- itself—he asserts that ulti-
mately it seeks to find form in the world:
Yet wherefore heaving sway and restless roll
This side and that, except to emulate
Stability above? To match and mate
Feeling with knowledge,— make as manifest
Soul’s work as Mind’s work . . .  (ll. 183–187)
Along with employing meta phors of the ocean’s surface and depth to show 
how soul endeavors to embody itself in forms of the material world, Browning 
also describes the pro cess of manifestation in metallurgical terms: “run 
mercury into a mould like lead” (l. 192) and “shoot / Liquidity into a mould” 
(ll. 209–210). Soul seeks to manifest itself in the empirical world, its groundless 
viscosity seeking material encasement, just as Schopenhauer’s  will is embodied 
in the world of repre sen ta tion.
It is this material realization of soul that is the “prize” and “puzzle” of art 
(l. 195), and Browning asks the same question that was posed, and answered, 
by the Romantic generation before him: “Does Mind get Knowledge from Art’s 
ministry?” (l. 200). Schopenhauer argues that the mind does indeed derive 
knowledge from art  because art is able to objectify or represent the  will by 
means of the Platonic ideas.  These ideas are the highest objectification of the 
 will  because they deal in essences rather than in particulars; they do not take 
on a form par tic u lar to knowledge but rather precede all knowledge. All of the 
arts endeavor to represent the eternal Platonic ideas, just as the ideas are an 
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objectification of the  will; therefore, Schopenhauer says that art can be de-
fined “as the way of considering  things in de pen dently of the princi ple of sufficient 
reason” (p. 185). Thus, through bypassing the princi ple of sufficient reason, it is 
pos si ble to grasp the ideas that are embodied in art.
As the repre sen ta tion of the Platonic ideas, art is a copy of a copy that 
offers only an indirect route to the  will. However, for Schopenhauer,  music 
stands apart from all of the other arts in its unmediated power to express the 
innermost being of the world and of our own selves. According to Schopen-
hauer, this transcendent quality of  music suggests that we must look beyond 
the aesthetic experience of  music as merely the effect on our perception of 
 music’s empirical and external form— the sound that is the progression of notes 
over time— and that  these “numerical ratios into which it [ music] can be resolved 
are related not as the  thing signified, but only as the sign” (p. 256). Schopenhauer 
explains that  music, unlike the other arts, is not mediated through concepts, 
and in bypassing the understanding, it speaks a language that is intelligible to 
all.  Music always reveals the inner nature of  every phenomenon and “gives 
the innermost kernel preceding all form, or the heart of  things” (p. 263). As the 
most immediate expression of feeling,  music is not a copy of the ideas but a 
copy of the  will itself; therefore, “ music does not express this or that par tic u lar 
and definite plea sure, this or that affliction, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety, merri-
ment, or peace of mind, but joy, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, peace 
of mind themselves, to a certain extent in the abstract, their essential nature” 
(p. 261).  Music directly expresses the essence of noumenal truth.
Browning too believes that the mind can receive knowledge from art’s 
ministry  because art apprehends eternal truths. Through art, “What’s known 
once is known ever” (l. 201). Yet, as with Schopenhauer, Browning views art as 
belonging to the world of repre sen ta tion. Indeed, Browning uses the same meta-
phor of building, gathering, and assembling to depict the artistic pro cess that 
he utilizes to delineate the workings of mind: “Arts arrange, / Dissociate, re- 
distribute, interchange / Part with part, lengthen, broaden, high or deep / 
Construct their bravest” (ll. 201–204). It is only through enhancing  these 
structural maneuverings that the artist can reveal more clearly the idea concealed 
beneath them: “what lay loose / At first lies firmly  after, what design / Was faintly 
traced in hesitating line / Once on a time, grows firmly resolute / Henceforth 
and evermore” (ll. 205–209). Despite the fact that art’s ministry endeavors to 
represent eternal ideas, its pro cesses are still implicated in the pro cesses of 
reason  because they are mediated.
Each art form seeks to “stay the apparition” (l. 218) and may succeed in 
this to varying degrees, but  music surpasses the other art forms in its capacity 
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to express truth: “ There is no truer truth obtainable / By Man than comes of 
 music” (ll. 138–139). Browning declares about  music, “Dredging deeper yet / 
Drag into day,—by sound, thy master- net,— / The abysmal bottom- growth, 
ambiguous  thing / Unbroken of a branch, palpitating / With limbs’ play and 
life’s semblance!” (ll. 235–239).  Music expresses soul, whereas sound is  music’s 
form that has been manifested into a progression of notes. The Romantic idea 
that  music precedes sound is crucial for the way in which Browning utilizes 
the symbol of  music in his poetry:  music plunges into the depths of soul, and 
sound is the “master- net” that works to bring it forth into day. Browning also 
draws on the meta phor of night and day, where night is the realm of noumenal 
truth and day is the realm of manifestation— a meta phor that was pop u lar ized 
by Novalis in his Hymns to the Night—to emphasize that sound embodies the 
 music of the “unsounded sea” that is soul (l. 161).14
For Browning, although transcendent ideas are eternal, their material 
embodiments are inevitably subject to material changes. He explores this sub-
ject in “Charles Avison” by pondering the temporal transformations in musi-
cal fashion: when Browning asks how it is that Avison’s outdated  music can 
still be a perfect expression of soul and yet how Wagner’s new  music can be 
equally as true, he is not conceding that all  music is subjective, as Marc Pla-
mondon suggests,15 but rather that new musical styles are dif fer ent embodi-
ments of eternal ideas— they are the forms that freshly embody universal 
emotions so that they can be perceived from the temporal side of the world. 
Note how it is that the ideas wait “Till  Music loose them, fit each filmily / 
With form enough to know and name it by” (ll. 261–262): ideas persist yet are 
only known when a fit form is periodically found. Browning returns to the 
German Romantic meta phor of night and day to denote this manifestation: 
“Nor to such appeal / Is  Music long obdurate: off they steal— / How  gently, 
dawn- doomed phantoms! back come they / Full- blooded with new crimson of 
broad day— / Passion made palpable once more” (ll. 265–269). Thus, although 
the musical expression of soul is indeed transitory, Browning shares Schopen-
hauer’s conviction that if it could be fixed,  music would completely transmit 
the transcendent substrate of the world.
The full implication of  music for Browning’s foundational epistemology 
is articulated in La Saisiaz (1878), a highly personal poem in which Browning 
professes to look for answers to metaphysical questions from within the scope 
of reason.16 La Saisiaz has not yet been analyzed for its discussion of  music, but 
this discussion is in fact the symbolic key that Browning provides for our 
interpretation of the poem. Written  after the shockingly sudden death of 
his good friend Miss A. Egerton- Smith, Browning begins his inquiry into 
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metaphysics by presenting two ontological conditions of knowledge: that God 
exists and that the soul is eternal; however; he admits at the start that he can-
not fully impart this knowledge to the reader of his poem. Turning first to the 
idea of  music, he attests the futility of speech’s aim to express truth: “I  shall no 
more dare to mimic such response in futile speech, / Pass off  human lisp as 
echo of the sphere- song out of reach” (ll. 153–154). Browning  later compares 
the futility of fully translating divine  music into  human speech to an impos-
sible attempt to extrapolate the sound of a roaring avalanche from the sound 
of a single clump of earth thrown to the ground.  Human speech is unavailing 
for Browning  because it is implicated in conceptual cognition and thus can-
not access the noumenal “sphere- song out of reach.” Donald Hair has explored 
in detail the similarity of Browning’s conception of speech to John Locke’s 
understanding that the connection between the sign and the signified is en-
tirely arbitrary;17 however, while it is true that Browning avers the ontological 
separation of the sign and the signified, it is impor tant to note that he juxta-
poses language with  music, as he does so many times in his poetry, in order to 
show that the divine totality (represented by  music) is made manifest in the 
laws of succession and plurality (represented by speech).
Although Browning confirms that he cannot speak of the divine sphere 
in  human language, he also proclaims that knowledge outside of the empirical 
scope of reason is indeed pos si ble through fancy. It is easy to misunderstand 
what Browning means by this term; although “fancy” for Coleridge designates 
the empirical conception of the associative imagination, Browning uses the 
term “fancy,” like Dickens, to refer to Shelley’s concept of imagination, the 
faculty that accesses objective truth. “Fancy” for Browning is not the empiri-
cal associative imagination but rather the imaginative faculty that perceives 
the essences that are inexplicable to the princi ple of sufficient reason. How-
ever, Hair assumes that Browning’s notion of fancy, along with his understand-
ing of language, is Lockean and defines it in its empirical sense as “something 
made up in the mind, something which does not correspond to the relations 
we actually observe outside us” (p. 265). This leads Hair to conclude that Brown-
ing’s Lockean theory of language results in his emphasis on the necessity of 
reason, which despite the relativity of language can still make a judgment and 
thereby infer a probable relation between name and idea (p. 261).
Yet fancy and fact are ontologically linked for Browning: while fancy is 
the faculty that apprehends soul, fact comprises soul’s manifestation in the 
empirical laws that condition our perception of the material world. Browning 
also states that fancy circumvents the conditioned realm of fact and thus has 
access to the initial cause and of the ultimate effect: “Fact it is I know I know 
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not something which is fact as much. / What before caused all the  causes, 
what effect of all effects / Haply follows,— these are fancy” (ll. 224–226). Brown-
ing expresses this more simply in “Gerard de Lairesse” (“Parleyings,” CW, 16: 
95–111), when he asserts that fancy deals with “fact unseen but no less fact the 
same” (l. 152) or, in other words, with facts that the senses cannot see and that 
reason cannot discern.
Although fancy for Browning apprehends immaterial truth, in grieving 
for his recently deceased friend in La Saisiaz, he longs for more tangible proof 
of the soul’s afterlife. Thus, in trying to know rationally what he has perceived 
through fancy, Browning places his argument within the scope of reason, which 
interacts with the facts of the material world: it is a deliberate exercise that ex-
erts “Sense and thought on fact, and then, from fact educing fit surmise” (l. 522). 
Within the realm of mind, Browning entertains a series of conjectures— that 
God seems good and wise or that hope for the afterlife proves the existence of 
the afterlife— and follows their logical implications; yet the weakness of  these 
conjectures, as Browning sees it, is that they engage in circular reasoning, since 
the proof of such a surmise can only be sought in its own premise.
Browning continues to explore  these suppositions, what he terms “con-
jecture styled belief,” (l. 233) by conditionally positing the complete subjectiv-
ity of all experience, which is the necessary end point of empirical philosophy. 
Browning notes that subjectivity is an idea that “loomed im mense to fancy” 
(l. 296)— because in apprehending the wide scope of objective truth, fancy 
cannot sustain the notion that truth is subjective and par tic u lar to  every 
individual— but he explains that subjectivity is far more palatable to reason. 
Through calculation and the balancing of data, reason can “postulate omnip-
otence” (l. 294) and deduce a moral judgment; yet Browning observes that if 
fancy (the pursuit of objective truth)  were attempted through fact (knowledge 
that is only derived from sensory experience), the results would be fruitless 
 because of their bounded nature.
In a brief, yet crucial, part of the poem that has been overlooked, Brown-
ing turns again to  music to symbolize the realm of soul that cannot be dis-
cerned through the princi ple of sufficient reason. Taking a rest from logic, his 
“brain o’erloaded” (l. 380), Browning passionately asks  whether he has forgot-
ten “the open vast where soon or late converged / Ways through winding?— 
world- wide heaven- high sea where  music slept or surged / As the angel had 
ascendant, and Beethoven’s Titan mace / Smote the im mense to storm Mozart 
would by a fin ger’s lifting chase?” (ll. 381–384).  Music precedes the sound that 
brings it forth:  music sleeps  until it is stirred up by Beethoven’s divine genius, 
his “Titan mace,” and is pursued by Mozart’s dexterous touch.  Here Browning 
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utilizes the same language as E. T. A. Hoffmann, who proclaimed in his famous 
1810 “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony” that Beethoven’s  music enables 
the listener to transcend the senses and to be transported directly to the infinite 
realm.18 The night- realm of  music is the space of the noumenal, and the com-
pressed alliteration within “world- wide heaven- high sea” holds together the op-
positional axes of heaven and earth to denote how  music, as the expression of 
the ideal, encompasses all of existence. At this critical moment in the poem, it 
is the symbol of  music that alerts the reader to an epistemological turning point 
and to a level of perception that transcends Browning’s recourse to reason.19
Browning continues to allude to this unspoken ele ment through the con-
nection that he makes between  music and silence. Browning’s cry of “Silence!” 
(l. 390) appears to check the skeptical conclusions that have thus far ensued 
from his suppositions about faith, but it also serves a far subtler and more 
impor tant symbolic meaning. Since one half of a duality has no existence with-
out the other, silence actually presupposes sound’s perpetual presence; it is not 
the absence of sound but the deafening and imperceptibly potential presence 
of sound. Since both silence and  music express noumenal truth, they precede 
the temporal iterations of sound; therefore, the two terms are equated in 
Romantic  music philosophy. It is this ontological equality of  music and silence 
that provides an explanation for why Wagner exclaimed that Beethoven first 
heard  music  after becoming deaf.20
Browning contrasts his concept of silence with that of muteness to dis-
tinguish between fancy and reason. In contrast to silence, muteness is a linear, 
temporal event during which sound is truly switched off; it belongs to the 
realm of phenomena, co- occurring with, rather than preceding, sound. There-
fore, when Browning’s conjectures have to grapple with “Fact’s inexorable rul-
ing ‘Outside fact, surmise be mute!’ ” (l. 392), he realizes that surmise can have 
no voice in fact’s phenomenal domain, and just as sound cannot be glimpsed 
in muteness, Browning implies that truth cannot be reached through reason. 
Indeed, logical suppositions are bounded within the princi ple of sufficient rea-
son: they inscribe a circle beyond which they may not venture. By contrast, 
Browning shows how fancy lies outside of reason’s bounded circle, encompass-
ing fact. Although the intimations of fancy cannot be logically proven, it has 
a vantage of the totality that is beyond the reach of reason: “Thus have we 
come back full circle: fancy’s footsteps one by one / Go their round conducting 
reason to the point where they begun” (ll. 525–526). Reason arrives at the 
place where it began— unable to prove or disprove the fancy’s perception of 
the divine, which can only be expressed in the poem by the symbol of  music.21
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Browning revisits the correlation between  music and fancy in “Flute 
 Music, with an Accompaniment.”22 Two lovers walking through the forest hear 
a flutist playing  music in the distance, which elicits a debate between the two 
speakers as to the merits of the work. Penelope Gay argues that the two dis-
tinct responses to the overheard composition reflect Browning’s empirical view 
that what  music can express is ultimately circumscribed by subjective interpre-
tation;23 however, this is actually another instance of Browning utilizing the 
Romantic distinction between  music as idea and  music as form to explore the 
epistemological faculties of fancy and reason. The man perceives the distant 
notes to carry a fresh expression of the eternal, universal emotion of love, de-
claring that such an experience could not be entirely of this world: “Holds 
earth such a won der? / Fairy- mortal, soul- sense- fusing / Past thought’s power to 
sunder!” (ll. 42–44). Representing fancy, he proclaims that rational thought 
cannot sunder his imaginative perception of the composition, which intuits in 
the notes an expression of the ideal realm. The female speaker, however, main-
tains the opposite position and asks him to look at the facts. Analyzing the 
 music for its technical imperfections, she insists that the player is most likely 
an amateur musician practicing his notes. Rather than demonstrating the sub-
jectivity of experience, Browning shows that the  woman, in perceiving the 
composition through her reason, can only consider  music as consisting of form 
and not as serving as a vessel for transcendent truth.
Although it is Browning’s conviction that fancy circumvents the princi-
ple of sufficient reason to apprehend noumenal truth, it is also his view that its 
insights cannot be fully embodied in art, which, in contrast to  music, is impli-
cated in the pro cesses of conceptual thought; therefore, the symbol of  music 
also becomes an impor tant means through which Browning discusses the ide-
alism of the subjective poet. Indeed, Browning turns to  music again and again 
in his early poetry to discuss the relationship between idealism, his early idol 
Shelley, and the development of his objective poetics. The correlation that 
Browning sees between  music and the Romantic poet is unequivocally stated 
in his 1851 “Essay on Shelley.”24 Browning defines Shelley as the archetypal 
subjective poet who seeks, through his own soul, “Not what man sees, but 
what God sees— the Ideas of Plato” (CW, 5: 138). Shelley glimpsed in “the 
universe, nature and man, their  actual state of perfection in imperfection” 
(5: 142), and since he was not willing to accept “the manifold partial develop-
ments of beauty and good on  every side,” he left “them the ultimates he found 
them” (5: 142). It is this interpretation of Shelley’s enduring idealism that leads 
Browning to pronounce that Shelley was “moved by and suffused with a  music 
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at once of the soul and the sense” (5: 143), where  music symbolizes Shelley’s 
acute perception of the existence of ideal forms.
Browning invokes  music and its implications for questions of epistemol-
ogy in his very first published poem, Pauline: The Fragment of a Confession 
(1833), to explore his youthful passion for Shelley and his relationship to ideal-
ism.25 When the poet- narrator recounts to Pauline his journey from the first 
intimations of poetic aspiration to his mature poetic stance, he explains how 
Shelley’s idealism set him the task: “To disentangle, gather sense from song: / 
Since, song- inwoven, lurked  there words which seemed / A key to a new world, 
the muttering / Of angels, something yet unguessed by man” (ll. 413–416). 
Shelley’s poetry is song—is  music— because it speaks of and takes the young 
poet to the Platonic ideas that he had begun to perceive through fancy; how-
ever, the challenge for the narrator, and for Browning, is to find out  whether 
he can ultimately realize or “gather sense” from  these ideal forms that he fol-
lows in Shelley’s bewitching song. Yet upon facing the real world, the narrator 
soon realizes that no ideal can ever be fully realized, precipitating his disillu-
sion and despair. Declaring that he  will no longer look within, the maturing 
poet apprehends the fundamental transition that has taken place in his poetic 
philosophy, telling his lover, “I aim not even to catch a tone / Of harmonies he 
[Shelley] called profusely up” (ll. 216–217). Nevertheless, he maintains that 
Shelley’s song can still be heard: “A melody some wondrous singer sings, / 
Which, though it haunt men oft in the still eve, / They dream not to essay; yet 
it no less / But more is honoured” (ll. 222–225), demonstrating that rather 
than renouncing Shelley, Browning makes his  music an abiding symbol 
for the noumenal aspect of the world that precedes its imperfect material 
manifestation.
Browning continues to use the symbol of  music in Paracelsus (1835) to 
delineate both Paracelsus’s and the poet Aprile’s failed quests for the absolute 
(CW, 1: 64–266). Aprile explains to Paracelsus that his plight has been to love 
infinitely and to be loved infinitely in return, and in striving to give form to all 
the beauties of nature and passions of humanity, he has endeavored in vain: 
“to perfect and consummate all, / Even as a luminous haze links star to star, / I 
would supply all chasms with  music, breathing / Mysterious motions of the 
soul, no way / To be defined save in strange melodies (bk. 2, ll. 475–479). 
Although Aprile looks to the forms of the material world, his desire to en-
compass all of them is akin to the way Paracelsus seeks complete knowledge. 
The poet concedes to Paracelsus that he knew that his potential to fully 
embody each of the world’s disparate forms was beyond his “mortal power” 
(bk. 2, l. 586) and that he should have chosen one and given it “entire / In beauty, 
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to the world” (bk. 2, ll. 584–585). Aprile also conceives of Paracelsus’s quest 
for the absolute as song: “Sing thou, and I  will sit / Beside, and call deep 
silence for thy songs, / And worship thee” (bk. 2, ll. 374–376); furthermore, 
when Paracelsus’s dreams of divine knowledge vanish, “they pass in song!” 
(bk. 4, l. 189).
The Romantic conception that  music precedes thought is utilized by 
Browning in Pauline when the poet- speaker compares the early stirrings of 
soul to a bard who first plays  music and then translates  these intuitions into 
the rational realm of words, or the bard’s song: “And first I sang as I in 
dream have seen /  Music wait on a lyrist for some thought, / Yet singing to 
herself  until it came” (ll. 377–379). In Sordello, Browning turns again to the 
role of the bard who is a musician, as well as a poet who crafts the words of 
his songs, to express the prob lem of realizing fully in the phenomenal world 
the intimations of the soul.26 Sordello finds himself “Sundered in twain” 
(bk. 2, l. 657) when he discovers that language is not able to express what 
the fancy conceives. Browning returns to the symbol of  music to express 
this dilemma. Sordello wished to capture the harmony of all nature in his 
song, but “Meditate / Too long on such a morning’s cluster- chord / And the 
 whole  music it was framed afford,— / The chord’s might half discovered, 
what should pluck / One string, his fin ger, was found palsy- struck” (bk. 6, ll. 
528–532). In focusing exclusively on the under lying noumenal essence of 
the natu ral world, the harmony of the “cluster- chord,” Sordello has tried to 
furnish the  music that frames this totality, and since this is only partially 
rendered, he finds that the fin ger that should have plucked one note at a 
time is unable to play at all.
Michael Yetman views Browning’s turn to objective poetry as an exor-
cism of Shelley’s subjective poetry, but Britta Martens observes how Browning 
often looked for an objective poetic that might retain his lyrical ideal.27 How-
ever,  because Martens views Browning’s definition of the objective poet as 
missing the “transcendental component” of the subjective poet, she concludes 
that Browning necessarily undermines the pursuit of transcendent truth that 
he sees as defining the Romantic proj ect (p. 165). I would argue, however, that 
although Browning defines the objective poet in contrast to the subjective 
poet as “one whose endeavour has been to reproduce  things external,” this 
does not exclude Shelley’s idealism  because Browning views the objective world 
as embodied from the ideal (“Essay on Shelley,” CW, 5: 137).
Browning reveals this conviction explic itly in his explanation that the 
“double faculty” of the objective poet sees “external objects more clearly, widely, 
and deeply, than is pos si ble to the average mind”— seeing in the object what 
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the noumenal substrate originally endeavored to form, but he is also “so ac-
quainted and in sympathy with its narrower comprehension” that he sees the 
idea in its necessarily lower forms of material manifestation. This double fac-
ulty extends beyond an object as it is empirically presented to perceive both its 
ideal content and its empirical form in order to help  those  people “who would 
have missed the deeper meaning and enjoyment of the original object” (“Essay 
on Shelley,” CW, 5: 137).
The objective poet must find a fit form to pres ent the object as both 
ideal and real, and Browning finds this in the monologue. E. Warwick Slinn 
and Loy D. Martin view Browning’s development of the dramatic monologue 
as a Victorian response to Romantic epistemology, both considering the mono-
logue as a testament to the poststructural assumption that  there is no real ity 
in de pen dent of thought or language.28 As the recent philosophical trend of 
speculative realism notes, this “correlationism” in twentieth- century critical 
theory, as Quentin Meillassoux terms it, is itself a further articulation of the 
Kantian argument that it is impossible to know the thing- in- itself outside of 
the a priori forms of perception.29 Browning agrees with Schopenhauer that 
the majority of humankind lives within this princi ple of sufficient reason— a 
point that Browning implies in his “Essay on Shelley”; yet both Browning and 
Schopenhauer depart from Kant by using Romantic  music philosophy to show 
that  there are two distinct ways of looking at the object: through reason as a 
series of empirical and logical relations or through fancy as the manifested 
aspect of the noumenal realm. Browning and Schopenhauer take into account 
 those aspects of psy chol ogy that anticipate critical theory, yet their founda-
tional epistemology allows them to overstep the attendant conclusion that it 
undermines the possibility of absolute truth.
In viewing the world through fancy, Schopenhauer declares that “we 
could just as well call the world embodied  music as embodied  will” since, like 
 music, the world embodies the inner essential spirit of  every phenomenon 
(pp. 262–263). Carlyle invokes  music to make the same argument in his On 
Heroes, Hero- Worship, and the Heroic in History— lectures that Browning at-
tended in 1840— when he exclaims, “The seeing eye! It is this that discloses 
the inner harmony of  things; what Nature meant, what musical idea Nature 
has wrapped up in  these often rough embodiments” (p. 67).30 Writing to Jo-
seph Milsand during the composition of Men and  Women, Browning explained 
that he was attempting “ ‘Lyr ics,’ with more  music and painting than before, so 
as to get  people to hear and see.”31 The correlation between  music and paint-
ing expresses how the monologue for Browning, like humankind itself, is 
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embodied  music. This means that its objective form comprises both the realms 
of  will and repre sen ta tion, the ideal and its embodiment in the real. Indeed, 
Browning’s speakers are the “rough embodiments,” and the “musical idea” is 
not only the germ of truth that Browning sees in  every one of his speakers but 
also the philosophical idea that each monologue conveys. In presenting  these 
personas as an object for the “co- operating fancy” of the reader, Browning’s 
monologues illuminate what Shaw terms the “astonishing (and often disturb-
ing) life of ideas,” as well as revealing what Browning sees as crucial prob lems 
of epistemology.32
Browning’s  music monologues are an impor tant example of how Brown-
ing reveals ideas through an existential prob lem posed by one of his speakers. 
Indeed, although Browning’s  music monologues, “Abt Vogler” (1864),33 “Mas-
ter  Hugues of Saxe- Gotha” (1855; “Men and  Women,” CW, 5: 285–292), and 
“A Toccata of Galuppi’s” (1855; “Men and  Women,” CW, 5: 197–199), have 
not been seen to encompass one unified idea about  music, in the light of 
Browning’s  music symbolism, it is apparent that  these monologues are com-
panion pieces in which Browning uses  music to express his foundational 
 Romantic epistemology. For Browning,  music is both numerical form and 
ideal content: while reason may only span the temporal structure of  music, it 
is fancy that perceives  music as noumenal expression, and this becomes the 
focal point through which Browning explores the ironic tension between 
the ideal and its problematic manifestation in the realms of art (“Abt  Vogler”), 
religion (“Master  Hugues of Saxe- Gotha”), and science (“A Toccata of 
Galuppi”).
Since both the speaker of a monologue and the linguistic action of the 
monologue itself necessarily belong to the world of repre sen ta tion, Browning 
begins “Abt Vogler” with the composition that Vogler builds in his mind, the 
external laws of conceptual thought that strive to express internal soul. The 
keys of Vogler’s organ are the tools that express sound, and Browning equates 
the musician’s pro cess of composition with Solomon’s call for the creatures of 
earth, heaven, and hell to build his palace. Just as Browning does in “Charles 
Avison,” he uses architectural imagery to show that this is the temporal form 
of  music that belongs to conditioned laws of the material world; yet Browning 
emphasizes that Vogler’s composition is fashioned out of notes that would have 
no intrinsic meaning without his initial divine inspiration, just as Solomon’s 
host is also the manifestation of an internal noumenal force: they “rush into sight 
at once as he named the ineffable Name” (l. 6). Continuing this imagery of tem-
poral manifestation, Vogler’s notes “build / broad on the roots of  things, / Then 
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swim up again into sight” (ll. 14–15); they are built “fearless of flame, flat on 
the nether springs,” (l. 16) and yet his composition at this point in the poem 
has failed to express the totality of his initial inspiration.
Vogler knows that notes by themselves are governed by finite rules, and 
thus like the other art forms of poetry and painting, it is “art in obedience to 
laws” (l. 47); however, Browning shows that the combination of three or more 
notes into harmony sparks something altogether more than the sum of its con-
stituent notes, and it is only in this  whole that Vogler is able to encapsulate 
his initial inspiration: “And I know not if, save in this, such gift be allowed 
to man, / That out of three sounds he frame, not a fourth sound, but a star” 
(ll. 51–52). Transcending the outer forms of conceptual knowledge— the laws 
of cause and effect that govern the arrangement of the individual notes, Vogler’s 
 music “is the fin ger of God, a flash of the  will that can, / Existent  behind all 
laws, that made them, and, lo, they are!” (ll. 49–50).
Despite the fact that Vogler’s harmonies express his soul,  music is by 
nature elusive and transitory. The tension that Vogler feels between his infi-
nite  music and its finite embodiment is very similar to the experiences of Wack-
enroder and Tieck’s fictional musician, Joseph Berlinger, who is torn between 
his ecstatic, transcendent flights with  music and the inevitable descent into 
the material realm.34 However, although  music is fleeting, Browning uses  music 
in “Abt Vogler” as a symbol for the ideal forms that are perceived by feeling 
and fancy but cannot be fully expressed in the world of sense. Thus, when 
Vogler declares, “Well, it is earth with me” (l. 89), it is not a pessimistic view of 
 music or a condemnation of the material world, as it is for Berlinger, but rather 
a recognition that only in heaven  will  things exist in their inner essence and 
not in their phenomenal form: “All we have willed or hoped or dreamed of 
good  shall exist; / Not its semblance, but itself” (ll. 73–74).
While Vogler’s  music expresses soul, the church organist who plays the 
fictional Master  Hugues’s fugue in “Master  Hugues of Saxe- Gotha” cannot get 
to the inner truth of  Hugues’s work: “So your fugue broadens and thickens, / 
Greatens and deepens and lengthens, / Till we exclaim— ‘But where’s  music, 
the dickens?’ ” (ll. 96–98). It may initially appear strange to ask for  music con-
sidering that the speaker is in the pro cess of playing  Hugues’s composition, yet 
it is explained by the fact that, in looking for the “ music” in Master  Hugues’s 
arrangement, the speaker holds the Romantic view that believes  music can 
convey ideal content, rather than an empirical view that sees  music to consist 
in form. The struggling player imagines Master  Hugues reprimanding him for 
knowing the notes but not understanding the composer’s purpose. However, 
the speaker perceives that  Hugues’s notion of success is superficially based on 
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the technical dexterity that separates him from other players when, in con-
trast to  Hugues, the speaker is looking for the inner meaning of the  music that 
has a significance beyond form.
Browning engages questions of epistemology through this tension be-
tween  music as form and  music as content: since  Hugues’s fugue does not reach 
beyond its material structure, Browning uses the song’s form as a meta phor for 
the epistemological faculty of reason that can only interact with the phenom-
enal realm.35 While Vogler’s composition embodies  music— the expression of 
his soul— Browning implies that Master  Hugues’s fugue only reflects the futile 
intellectualizing of the modern age: “Nothings grow something which quietly 
closes / Heaven’s earnest eye: not a glimpse of the far land / Gets through our 
comments and glozes” (ll. 118–120). In likening the artificiality of  Hugues’s 
fugue to the web that  people weave in their lives through the intellect or 
through reason— “Such a web,  simple and subtle, / Weave we on earth  here in 
impotent strife” (ll. 107–108)— the speaker exclaims that instead of viewing 
“God’s gold” (l. 114) or allowing “a glimpse of the far land” (l. 119),  Hugues’s 
dexterous fugue merely obscures it.36 This has broader philosophical signifi-
cance for Browning as it reaffirms his personal conviction in La Saisiaz that 
religious ideas cannot be known through reason but can only be apprehended 
by feeling and fancy.
The toccata is a form that, like the fugue, showcases a player’s technical 
dexterity, and Browning shows in “A Toccata of Galuppi’s” that Galuppi’s  music, 
in a way similar to Master  Hugues’s  music, is unable to transcend the material 
realm. The speaker of Browning’s monologue is a nineteenth- century scien-
tist, who upon listening to Galuppi’s composition imaginatively proj ects him-
self into the world that is embodied in the composer’s  music. Although on the 
surface  there appears to be a discrepancy between what the speaker perceives 
as Galuppi’s “stately” (l. 18) and “cold” (l. 33)  music and the gay frivolity of the 
Venetians, the fact that the progression of Galuppi’s chords mirrors their 
thoughts— “What?  Those lesser thirds so plaintive, sixths diminished, sigh 
on sigh, / Told them something?” (ll. 19–20)— shows that Browning means 
Galuppi’s toccata to be an analogue of eighteenth- century Venetian society. 
That Galuppi’s toccata is unable to express the ideal is expressed in the poem by 
the very fact that it reminds the revelers of their inevitable mortality: “ Those 
suspensions,  those solutions— ‘Must we die?’ ” (l. 20). The speaker recognizes 
that the Venetians are desperately looking for confirmation of their immortal-
ity in Galuppi’s  music and that this desire is mirrored in the expected resolu-
tion of the toccata: “Hark, the dominant’s per sis tence till it must be answered 
to!” (l. 24).
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That Galuppi’s “octave struck an answer” (l. 25) seems to suggest a musi-
cal resolution, and critics have varied in their view as to  whether returning to 
the tonic is positive or negative in its implications;37 yet I would argue that it 
is Galuppi’s inability to answer the Venetians that is the true crux of the poem. 
While the Venetians have been seemingly placated by the confirmation that 
they find in Galuppi’s  music, the speaker recognizes that his toccata only of-
fers a misleading resolution. The key issue  here is that although Galuppi ap-
pears to resolve the Venetians’ mortal anxiety by raising the octave in his 
toccata, thereby returning to the tonic that provides the resolution, it is cru-
cial to consider that, in the higher octave, Galuppi remains within the same 
dominant key; therefore, his elevation to the next octave does not evoke any-
thing dif fer ent harmonically, or symbolically, for the listener. Constricted by 
counterpoint, Galuppi’s toccata is not able to rise above its insistent melodic 
structure into a finer expression of harmony that would enable him to reach 
truth. It is this hollow sense of elevation that the speaker recognizes when he 
cries at the start of the poem, “Oh Galuppi, Baldassaro, this is very sad to find! / 
I can hardly misconceive you; it would prove me deaf and blind; / But although 
I take your meaning, ’tis with such a heavy mind!” (ll. 1–3). The speaker gives 
Galuppi credit for providing an ostensible answer to what the Venetians are 
looking for in his  music, but he sees that Galuppi is ultimately unable to raise 
them to a perception of the ideal.
The significance of  music for  matters of epistemology is made clear in 
the poem when the speaker, finding a correlation between his own scientific 
recourse to reason and Galuppi’s  music, begins to doubt the immortality of his 
own soul. The scientist imagines Galuppi denouncing the Venetians for their 
sensuality and envisions Galuppi comparing the speaker’s scientific pursuits 
against such frivolity, yet his comments are clearly ironic in tone  toward the 
speaker’s achievements: “Yours for instance: you know physics, something of 
geology, / Mathe matics are your pastime; souls  shall rise in their degree; / Butter-
flies may dread extinction,— you’ll not die, it cannot be!” (ll. 37–39). Schopen-
hauer argues that knowledge derived from the fields of mathe matics and 
science belongs to the world of repre sen ta tion since, in evaluating and com-
paring one repre sen ta tion to another,  people fail to perceive the mysterious 
inner nature of  these phenomena (pp. 96–97). Similarly, Galuppi’s sardonic 
praise implicitly connects the speaker’s interest in mathe matics and science with 
the sensory life of the Venetians to show that he too is unable to glimpse the 
ideal. When the speaker laments the transitory nature of life at the end of 
the monologue, he is left feeling “chilly and grown old” (l. 45), which reveals 
the doubt that he feels about the spiritual efficacy of reason.
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Belonging to the world of repre sen ta tion, Browning’s speakers strug gle 
in varying ways with apprehending or articulating the nature of the ideal, 
and in the  music monologues,  music is a symbol through which Browning 
embodies his conviction that the intellect cannot reach religious and scien-
tific truth as it only operates within the princi ple of sufficient reason. 
Browning’s poet- narrator returns to  music in the last lines of The Ring and 
the Book to restate this correlation between  music, fancy, and the proj ect of 
the objective poet:38
 — Art may tell a truth
Obliquely, do the  thing  shall breed the thought,
Nor wrong the thought, missing the mediate word.
So you may paint your picture, twice show truth,
Beyond mere imagery on the wall,—
So, note by note, bring  music from your mind,
Deeper then ever Beethoven dived,—
So write a book  shall mean beyond the facts,
Suffice the eye and save the soul beside. (bk. 12, ll. 859–867)
In seeking to re- create the external world of repre sen ta tion, the objective poet 
“twice show[s] truth”  because, in depicting empirical real ity, he also points to 
the eternal real ity that is the source of its phenomenal form— beyond the 
“mere imagery on the wall.” Turning to  music and to Beethoven, the arche-
typal Romantic musician, Browning asserts that the objective poet must see 
the facts of the material world musically—in other words, with fancy—in 
order to perceive their obfuscated meanings. In a series of monologues that 
aver the relativity of truth when only looked for within the confines of reason, 
it is the role of the objective poet to reveal the relationship between the real 
and the ideal. Indeed, in The Ring and the Book, Browning offers a key to 
Pompilia’s innocence when Caponsacchi observes how “ music seemed / Al-
ways to hover just above her lips / Not  settle,— break a silence  music too” 
(bk. 6, ll. 1196–1198).  Music philosophy is a central way that Browning con-
ceived of the relationship between the noumenal realm and its imperfect em-
bodiment in the material. If seen through fancy,  these phenomenal forms, 
while at a remove from what the ideal endeavored to form, are still expressions 
of  music. This is why Browning asks us again in “The Two Poets of Croisic” to 
consider  whether “Our simulated thunderclaps / Which tell us counterfeited 
truths— these same / Are— sound, when  music storms the soul, perhaps?” (CW, 
14: 129–209; 64: ll. 505–507).
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